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NO "DISHEVELMENT" OF THE RECORD OCCU 
AND THE COURT APPLIED THE PROPER ST RRED 
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THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE IN THI 
CASE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO BE PLED BY S 
STAUFFERS, WAS TRIED BY CONSENT, WAS 
IMPLIEDLY RAISED BY STAUFFERS ON APPEAL 
AND I IF APPLIED BY THIS COURT, WAS PROPERL" 
APPLIED. • • • • • • • . • • . . 1 
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GRANTED •••••• . ..... . 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
--DAVID M. STAUFFER and CONNIE A. 
STAUFFER, 
vs 
Plaintiffs, Appellants and 
Cross-Respondents, 
RUSSELL CALL and VELMA CALL 




NATURE OF THE CASE 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
TO BRIEF FOR PETITION 
ON REHEARING 
Case No. 15468 
This is an action by Plaintiffs, Appellants and Cross-
Respondents STAUFFER, (hereafter "STAUFFERS"), seeking 
specific performance of a Utah Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
and for partition. Defendants, Respondents, Cross-Appellants 
and Petitioners CALL and SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION, (hereafter 
"Defendants") seek to quiet title to the real property 
concerned, and request an order of restitution. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to the lower court on the sole 
issue of whether a certain Uniform Real Estate Contract 
dated 2 January 1969 constituted a valid and enforceable 
contract. Judgment was granted to Defendants, the lower 
court ruling that the contract was void and of no effect as 
a contract for the sale of real property, by reason of 
insufficiency of the descriptions in the document. Judgment 
was also rendered in favor of DAVID and CONNIE STAUFFER in 
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the amount of $9,228.00 as of 1 September 1977 
monies paid by STAUFFERS on the contract. 
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL 
, repr esent. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of, 
lower court, and ordered the case remanded to the lower 
court, with directions to determine the descriptions of ti' 
property purchased by STAUFFERS, to order Defendants to 
execute appropriate conveyances, and to conduct further 
proceedings consistent with the reversal and remand. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendants apparently seek a rehearing, even though 1 
Petition for Rehearing has been filed, hoping to get the 
Supreme Court to reverse its elf. STAUFFERS oppose the 
granting of a rehearing, and seek inunediate remittitur a: 
the case to the lower court, for further proceedings in 
accordance with the Supreme Court opinion filed 9 January 
1979. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On 2 January 19 69, school teacher DAVID M. STAUFFER a:; 
his wife, seeking a Utah refuge for themselves and their 
sixteen children, purchased lands from Defendants by way 0' 
a Uniform Real Estate Contract (R259;P-17; T211:8-17). It. 
wording of the descriptions involved was supplied by oefi:'. 
RUSSELL CALL. (Tl01:23-30; T25: 1-7). The total purchase 
price was $12, 000. 00, payable in two payments of $1,000J 
each, the balance being payable at the rate of $100.00 pe: 
month. STAUFFERS could accelerate payment of the amount a:' 
-2-
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STAUFFERS, together with their flock, went into possession 
of the property in April, 1969. (Tl 7: 19-25; R259) . They 
1 ived there as a family except for two school years, and 
always lived there during the summertime. (T220:22-30;T221:1-
13). It was most likely the winters of 1971 and 1974 that 
the family left the farm. However, during the time STAUFFERS 
were not physically in residence, they rented the property 
to persons of their choice. (T218: 18-23; T219: 22-30). The 
two homes on the property were unfit for human habitation, 
and STAUFFERS and their children renovated the homes for 
living purposes. Other substantial and significant improvements 
were also made upon and to the property over a period of 
years. In general, STA OFFERS and their family did everything 
that intelligent, progressive owners do to protect and 
improve their property. (T47 thru 50; R259-260). Defendants 
knew of the substantial improvements being made by STAUFFERS. 
(R260). So attached were STAUFFERS to their home that a son 
was interred on the property, binding them even closer to 
their chosen soil. (Tll5: 1-2). STAUFFERS faithfully made 
the monthly payments required of them. (R260). 
On or about 22 September 1972, STAUFFERS tendered full 
payment of the balance then due on their purchase contract, 
and requested their deeds. Delivery of deeds was refused by 
Defendants CALL. (R3, R45). After attempts to obtain title 
failed, this action was filed on 3 March 1973. 
Defendants CALL thereafter, as had been their obvious 
-3-
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intent since refusing to deliver deeds, sold the pro Perty 
second time to Defendant SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION for t:.c 
price of $60,000.00, exactly 500% of the price of theoriq: 
sale to STAUFFERS. (T267: 1-30; T268: 1-11) . 
At trial, the lower court found the contract unenforc,_ 
due to insufficiency of description, quieted title in Def:: 
and ordered all monies paid on the contract to be returnei 
to STAUFFERS, with interest from dates of payment. ($25J-
264; R265-268). At no time did Defendants ever tend~ 
return of the money paid by STAUFFERS. 
After trial and during appeal, Defendant SUNSET CANYc:, 
CORPORATION has regularly caused the property to be adver:: 
and offered for sale as commercial development property, 0: 
a price of about $4, 000. 00 per acre. Some specific repres'· 
made to the public about the value of the land are as foll: 
1. The property is "440 + acres on key interchange 
leading to Zion Park. Prime highway commercial potential. 
2. The property is the "investment opportunity of tf,, 
season ....... on all 4 sides of the interchange ..... This 
land is a syndicator's dream package!" 
3. "400 acres at this key interchange leading ~z~ 
National Park .•.... ready for its transformation to Highwi' 
commercial. Over 8000 cars per day during August. l,OODi 
plus visitors see Zion Park each year and are potent~l 
customers .....•. Priced under $4,000.00 per acre." 
(See Appendix, Affidavit of CONNIE A. STAUFFER). Using 
600 Of Defendants' figures, the land is now worth about $1, ' 
-4-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
if the "400-acre" figure is used, and about $1,760,000.00 
440 r ~s" fi'gure is used. if the " -ilC ~ 
When STAUFFERS purchased in 1969, their interest constituted 
one-half or more of the total ownership interest in the 
property, worth $12,000.00, the conservative value of the 
whole therefore being $24, 000. 00 or less. 
On an acreage basis, the land in question was worth 
$60.00 per acre if the 400-acre figure is used, and $54.54 
per acre if the 440-acres + is used. With Defendants willing 
to sell at about $4,000.00 per acre in the year 1978, the 
value of each acre of land has increased between 6, 666. 67% 
and 7,335.90%, depending on whether the high or low number 
of acres is used. Actually, the land value of the property 
may have risen as high as 12,574.66%. See Affidavit of 
Connie A. Stauffer. 
Defendants have never filed a Petition for Rehearing. 
See record on file. A "Brief for Petition on Rehearing" has 
been filed by Defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ANY REQUEST OF DEFENDANTS FOR REHEARING 
SHOULD BE DENIED FOR FAILURE OF DEFENDANTS 
TO FILE AND SERVE A PETITION FOR REHEARING 
WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED BY LAW. 
URCP 76(e) (1) states: 
"Within 20 days after the filing of the decision 
of the Suorerne Court, either party may petition 
the Court for a rehearing. The petition shall 
~ briefly the points wherein it is alleged 
tha~ !-h~ appellate court has erred. The 
petition shall be supported ~ ~ brief of 
the authorities relied upon to sustain the 
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points listed in such petition. Both th 
petition and brief in support thereQI mu:t 
be prepared in accordance with the requir 
of Rule 75(p), and shall be served upon t~ent: 
adverse party prior to filing. (Emphasis :ddei 
The record in this case shows that the decision of'. 
Supreme Court was filed on or about 9 January 1979. Def,. 
' upon reading the decision which went against them, deter:. 
that they needed additional time to prepare and file a 
petition for rehearing, and requested and were grant~~ 
13 February 1979, in which to file a petition for rehear::. 
See Ex Parte Motion to Extend Time for Filing Brief and 
Petition for Rehearing and Order, and Affidavit in suppo:: 
of Ex Parte Motion to Extend Time for Filing Brief a~ 
Petition for Rehearing, and URCP 76(f). 
On 9 February 1979, Defendants apparently filed the:: 
Brief for Petition on Rehearing, and on the same day, no: 
earlier, served copies upon counsel for STAUFFERS. See 
Brief for Petitioners. At no time has a petition for rer.eo:. 
been served or filed by Defendants, who find themselves1: 
the position of having a brief in support of a non-existc 
pleading, the time for filing such pleading having~~ 
passed. 
URCP 76 (e) clearly requires the timely filing and 
service of both a petition for rehearing and a supporting 
brief. In this case, no petition for rehearing has been 
filed or served by Defendants, and the court should n~ 
grant any rehearing, the prerequisites to such not h~~ 
been met. 
I t In Enrique v. Grant, 5 Utah 400, 16 P. 595 (188 8 ' .. 
-6-
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t early determined that a petition for rehearing was a cour 
The Court stated: 
1 al. ng not an argument. p "il 1 
"We call attention to the practice pursued in 
this case on motion for rehearing. The petition 
is an extended and elaborate argument in favor 
of a rehearing. This is not in conformity to 
the rule. The petition for rehearing is a 
pleading, and should not be an argument. If 
points and authorities are submitted, it should 
be in a separate instrument, and not as part of 
the petition." 
The rehearing requested in Enrique was denied. 
In our neighboring states, it was early decided that a 
late filing of a petition for rehearing would result in 
denial of the same. In Durgin v. McNally, 82 Cal. 595, 23 
P. 375 (1890), the petition for rehearing arrived and was 
filed one (1) day late. It was denied as being untimely. 
Wyoming early ruled that the rule requiring the filing of a 
petition for rehearing within a certain time, had the force 
of statutory law, and held that petitions filed after were 
unavailing. Dean v. Omaha-Wyoming Oil Co., 21 Wyo. 133, 129 
P. 1023, reh. den. 21 Wyo. 133, 128 P. 881 (1913). Even 
where the petition is mailed ~1ithin the time limit, but 
arrives late for filing, a rehearing will be denied. 
Whettlin v. Jones, 32 Wyo. 446, 236 P. 247, reh. den. 32 
Wyo. 446, 234 P. 515 (1925). Oregon has even held that 
where a rule of the Supreme Court fix es a time within which 
a petition for rehearing must be filed, the court has no 
discretion to grant a rehearing. Coyote Gold and Silver 
Mining Co., v. Ruble, 9 or. 121 (1881). Recent cases in 
sister states have held that a one (1) day filing delay 
-7-
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after extension of time, is too late, ~v Indu~tt~; ._, -
Commission, 107 Ariz. 285, 486 P.2d 183 (Ariz., 
1971); and that the time for filing a petition for 
rehear;. 
is not extended by the 3-day period ordinarily allowed for 
service by mail by another rule, Garrett v Garrett, 30 Co: 
App. 167, 505 P.2d 39 (Colo., 1971); all going to show th, 
jurisdictional nature of timeliness where petitions for 
rehearing are concerned. 
Since no proper petition for rehearing has been filec, 
no rehearing should be granted to Defendants. 
POINT II 
IF DEFENDANTS' "BRIEF FOR PETITION ON 
REHEARING" IS CONSTRUED TO BE A "PETITION 
FOR REHEARING", IT SHOULD BE DENIED FOR THE 
REASON THAT IT IS NOT IN PROPER FORM, CONTAINS 
ARGUMENT AND REARGUMENT, AND NO SUPPORTING BRIEF 
HAS BEEN TIMELY FILED. 
URCP 76 (e), of course, requires filing of both a pet:'.. 
for rehearing and a supporting brief on a timely basis. 
Enrique, supra, the only Utah case on point, requires the 
same. If Defendants urge that the Supreme court consider 
their "Brief for Petition on Rehearing" as constituting a 
petition for rehearing, the Supreme Court should not adopt 
such contention, but if it is adopted, such petition shou;: 
be denied for not being accompanied by a proper, supportinc 
brief. 
A petition for rehearing will not be considered int'.: 
absence of an accompanying brief. State v Sorenson, 34 
9 0 2 41 6 0 7 h d 3 4 9 0 2 41 p . 7 0 5, ani Wyo. , P . , re . en. Wyo. , 
34 Wyo. 84, 241 P. 707 (1926). In Tuttle v. Rohrer, 23 NY: 
305, 153 P. 27, reh. den. 23 Wyo. 305, 149 P. 857 (19 151 '' 
-8-
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. f as tjmely filed, entitled "Petition for Rehearing". 
br1e w 
The Wyoming supreme Court deemed it not in compliance with 
applicable rules governing rehearings, and denied the rehearing. 
In the instant case, we find either a brief unaccompanied by 
a petition, or a petition unaccompanied by a brief. We do 
not find Defendants in compliance with the applicable rules. 
rt is clear that the only document filed by Defendants 
applicable to a claimed rehearing, consists of argument, and 
of reargument of matters already heard by the Court. A 
petition containing argument and reargument should be stricken 
or properly denied. Washington Securities Co. v. Goodstein, 
79 Colo. 343, 246 P. 278 (1926); Dredge Corp. v. Husite Co., 
78 Nev. 69, 369 P.2d 676; cert. den. 83 s.ct. 39, 371 U.S. 
821 9 1.Ed. 2d 61 (1962); Gershenhorn v. Walter R. Shetz 
Enterprises, 73 Nev. 293, 306 P.2d 121 (1957); In re Powell's 
Estate, 62 Nev. 121, 144 P.2d 996 (1944); and Clark v. Jones, 
62 Nev. 72, 141 P.2d 385 (1943). 
As set out succinctly in Enrique, above, "The petition 
for rehearing is a pleading, and should not be an argument." 
Where a petition for rehearing does not comply with the 
rules set, it wil 1 not be heard. People ex rel. Dunbar 
South Platte Water Conservancy District, 139 Colo. 503, 343 
p. 2d 812 ( 19 5 9) . 
If the "Brief for Petition on Rehearing" is considered 
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a petition for rehearing timely filed, the "petiti 11 
on cor: 
argument, reargument, and is not accompanied by a proper 
supporting brief, and should therefore be denied. 
POINT III 
NO CONSIDERATION OF REHEARING SHOULD BE 
GRANTED IN THE ABSENCE OF JUSTICE ELLETT. 
Chief Justice ELLETT wrote the opinion of the Court. 
this matter, with Justices CROCKETT, MAUGHAN, and HALL 
concurring. Since filing of the opinion, Chief Justke 
ELLETT has retired. The Court has previously taken the 
position that where an opinion is rendered by the Court, 
that opinion will not be set aside except by the vote of, 
majority who heard the matter. Shipper's Best Exp., Inc. 
v. Newsome, 579 P.2d 1316 (Utah, 1978). 
The instant case was heard and decided by Justices 
ELLETT, CROCKETT, MAUGHAN, and HALL, with WILKINS dissentl:. 
Since the retirement of Chief Justice ELLETT, only four 
remain who heard the case. 
If any consideration is to be given to Defendants' 
request for rehearing, such consider a ti on should be given~ 
the five who decided the matter, particularly where the 
writer of the opinion could be appointed as a Justice Pro 
Tern for purposes of the hearing. If not so appointed, 
consideration of a request for rehearing by Defendants 
should only be undertaken by the four remaining members of 
the deciding Court. 
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The preferred course, though, would be to have the 
five who decided the case, decide any request for rehearing. 
This procedure is authorized by UCA 49-7-5. 7 (1953, as 
amended), which states in part: 
"Any judge who has retired under the 
provisions of this act and is physically 
and mentally able to perform the duties 
of the office and who is not engaged in 
the practice of law shall be entitled 
after retirement to serve from case 
to case as a justice of the Supreme 
Court upon invitation of the Chief 
Justice. . " 
If the Court is going to consider this matter at 
all, the Chief Justice should invite former Justice ELLETT 
to again sit as Justice of the Supreme Court for 
purposes of any such consideration, particularly where 
Justice ELLETT is the author of the Court's decision 
of 9 January 1979. 
POINT IV 
NO REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED, FOR THE REASON 
THAT T,HE SUPREME COURT DID NOT TAKE OR NEED 
TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE TO REACH ITS DECISION 
IN THE OPINION DATED 9 JANUARY 1979, AND THE 
CONCLUSION REACHED BY THE COURT THAT LAND 
VALUES INCREASED GREATLY IS AMPLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE RECORD. 
Defendants assert that the Court took "judicial notice" 
of the great increase in land values in the area of the 
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subject property since the contract of 2 January 1%g 
made. Whether "judicial knowledge" is the same thing 
as "judicial notice" is questionable. In any event, 
the wording "This Court takes judicial knowledge of 
was 
the fact that land values in the area increased great~ 
since the contract was made" found in the opinion is 
dictum not required for the Court to reach its decision. 
Further, the Court had actual, "judicial knowledge" 
of the increase in land values in the area, and had 
specific knowledge of the increase of the subject 
property, because such facts are clearly set forth in 
the record. The original, arm's-length transaction 
showed the land purchased by STAUFFERS to have a fair 
market value of $12,000.00. A while later, Defendanb 
CALL sold their interest in the contract to Defenda~ 
SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION for $60,000.00! Clearly, the 
record gave the Court "judicial knowledge" of the gr9t 
increase in the value of the land. (R259; P-17; T267:12·l~: 
T268:1-30; T269:1-15). In view of the record, this 
Court had and is charged with judicial knowledge of 
the great increase in value of the land involved in 
this matter, and properly so found. Such being the 
case, Defendants' clamor about "judicial notice" is 
not pertinent. 
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POINT V 
IF THE SUPREME COURT DID TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
OF THE GREAT INCREASE IN VALUE OF THE LAND, 
ANY REQUIREMENT OF A HEARING WOULD HAVE BEEN A 
FUTILE ACT, AND ANY ERROR MERELY HARMLESS ERROR, 
IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT DEFENDANTS HAVE MADE NO 
CLAIM OF BEING ABLE TO SHOW THAT THE VALUE OF 
PROPERTY IN THE AREA HAS NOT INCREASED GREATLY 
IN VALUE SINCE THE CONTRACT WAS MADE, AND PARTIC-
ULARLY IN VIEW OF DEFENDANT SUNSET CANYON'S OWN 
VALUATIONS SHOWING INCREASES BETWEEN 6,666% 
and 7,340%, AND PERHAPS AS HIGH AS 12,574% 
SINCE THE CONTRACT WAS MADE. 
Defendants claim that the Court committed error 
in taking "judicial notice" of the great increase in 
the value of the land involved in this case. While no 
"judicial notice" was taken, even if it had been, Defendants' 
arguments about error are without merit for the following 
reasons: 
1. At no place in their "Brief for Petition on 
Rehearing" do Defendants make any claim that a hearing 
would result in any finding that the land did not greatly 
increase in value since the contract was made. Lacking 
any such claim, a hearing would have been a futile act, 
a waste of the time of the parties, their counsel, and 
this Court. Also, since the record shows the increase, the 
increase was noticed, and URE 12 ( 4) , does not require a 
hearing in such a case. 
2. Further, if a hearing had been required, it 
would have resulted only in Defendants establishing that the 
land h,:ir 1· d . 0 ncrease in value somewhere between 6,666% and 
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7,340%, with a possible increase of 12,574% , using their 
own values as stated by DEXTER SNOW, President of S~s~ 
CANYON CORPORATION, which values of about $4, 000. oo P 
er 'c:. 
were published to the world in the Color Country Spectr~-, 
daily newspaper in Southern Utah, and the Washington Count 
News, a weekly newspaper in the County in which the pm~~ 
is located. See Appendix, Affidavit of CONNIE A. STAUFFE?. 
Admittedly, if a hearing were required, and if land value; 
had not increased greatly since 1969, Defendants' rights 
might have been harmed. Where, however, no claim has bee:. 
made by Defendants that the land has not increased great!; 
in value I and where SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION Is President, 
DEXTER C. SNOW, values the land at about $4,000.00 per acr, 
over the 1969 values of less than $60. 00 per acre, no allE: 
error in failing to give notice pursuant to URE 12(4) coc:: 
have harmed Defendants in any way. 
URCP 61 states: 
"No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect 
in any ruling or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by any of the parties, 
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal 
to take such action appears to the court , 
inconsistent with substantial justice. Thecooi 
at every stage of the proceeding must di~regard_ 
any error or defect in the proceeding which doe'. 
not affect the substantial rights of the partie:. 
Here, where a hearing on the great increases in land 
values would have served only to further silhouette and~:· 
the great increases in the value of the land already showr. 
tt r r· · 
upon the face of the record, Defendants are in a be e ·· 
-14-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
--
t he one they would occupy had such a hearing been held, than · 
d Y error in failing to hold such a hearing is mere an an_ 
harmless and non-prejudicial error. 
POINT VI 
NO "DISHEVELMENT" OF THE RECORD OCCURRED, 
AND THE COURT APPLIED THE PROPER STANDARD 
OF REVIEW IN REACHING ITS DECISION. 
Defendants apparently claim that the Court applied the 
wrong standard of review and that the opinion in this case 
was the result of the failure of then Chief Justice ELLETT, 
and impliedly of the failure of Justices CROCKETT, MAUGHAN 
and HALL, to read the trial transcript. No evidence shows the 
existence of any such failure or shows that the trail transcript 
was not reviewed. All files in the Clerk's office are available 
at all times to all justices, and it is not required that any 
part of a file be "checked out" when being reviewed by any 
Justice. It is the practice, however, for a Justice to 
"check out" items he takes from the building, as when he takes 
a part of a file home for evening study. In fact, the 
statement that Justice ELLETT checked out parts of the file, 
clearly shows his detailed attention to the case. 
Defendants have made no direct charge that Justices 
CROCKETT, MAUGHAN and HALL failed to read the record, but 
imply such failure. No evidence exists to support such 
implied charges, other than that in Defendants' wishful 
thinking. No charge, express or implied, has been made by 
Defendants that any of the Justices on the majority failed to 
read the "Brief of Respondents and Cross Appellants" which 
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was before the Court on appeal. A review of that d 
OCllJncr· 
clearly shows the fact of trial, and states facts in fa,,· 
'•. 
of Defendants much more favorably than the trial tra 
nscri:· 
its elf, as could be expected. Therefore, even if the 
Justices in the majority had failed to read the trial 
transcript, such Justices were apprised of the facts a~: 
issues involved by Defendants' own brief on appeal. 
Article VIII, Section 9, Constitution of Utah, requ:: 
that where equity is involved, this Court may review que:: 
of fact as well as questions of law, and indeed, has the'.. 
of examining questions of fact. The Supreme Court can ff. 
the evidence, make its own findings, and substitute its;. 
for that of the trial court when the ends of justice so 
require. Harding v. Harding, 26 U.2d 277, 488 P.2d 308 
(1971). 
To the extent that the majority opinion appears to 
controvert the findings of the lower court, it is clear 
that the Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, found in 
favor of STAUFFERS on pertinent questions of fact, and tr.0: 
substituted its own judgment for that of the lower court, 
is the privilege and duty of the Supreme Court in a prcpi: 
case, the instant case. 
Point II in Appellants' Brief, before the Court on a:: 
raises pertinent issues of fact for review by the s~nm 
Court, when it refers to the boundary agreement and marb: 
boundaries by Defendant CALL. 
There is no evidence on any record before the court, 
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that the court applied the standard of review used for 
summary judgments, and Defendants' claim that such standard 
was used by this Court has no foundation. 
POINT VII 
THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE IN THIS CASE 
WAS NOT REQUIRED TO BE PLED BY STAUFFERS, WAS 
TRIED BY CONSENT, WAS IMPLIEDLY RAISED BY 
STAUFFERS ON APPEAL, AND, IF APPLIED BY THIS 
COURT, WAS PROPERLY APPLIED. 
STAUFFERS pleadings clearly show their claim to specific 
performance. It was the duty of Defendants to raise any 
affirmative defenses to the same, and no further pleading of 
STAUFFERS was required. URCP 7{a) allows for a reply to an 
answer, where the court specifically orders a reply .. In this 
case, the lower court never did order any reply to Defendants' 
answer. 
The issue of part performance was raised and tried by 
consent, even by stipulation, at the time of trial. See 
T43:19-24, where RONALD W. THOMPSON, associate counsel for 
Defendants, stipulated STAUFFERS' possession, payments, and 
improvements, and also see T42:21-30, T43 through T51, and 
T47 through Tl26. The only objections raised were relevancy 
and materiality. Some of Mr. HUGHES' objections were granted; 
some were denied; but the salient factors of possession, 
payments, and substantial improvements by STAUFFERS were 
admitted by Defendants. 
Point II, Appellants' Brief, previously before the 
Court, raises the issue of part performance where it claimed 
error on the part of the trial court in failing to show 
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cure of alleged ambiguities in the contract. Defendants 
have sought to make the Court believe that the "part per: 
rule" is hard and fast, with no exceptions allowed, Such 
not the case. Defendants have relied extensively for su~, 
on Adams v. Manning, 46 U.82, 148 P.465 (1915). The site' 
these involved a certain receipt alleged to be s~n~~ 
Adams of $30. 00 as part payment for thirty acres of land. 
Nothing was said about the location of the land on the 
larger parcel. D. C. Adams was dead, and at the trial 
level, no direct evidence of the terms and conditions of: 
contract was shown, largely because of the "Dead Man sw~ 
The alleged possession of Manning was tenuous, at best, a:. 
in some doubt. The Adams Court stated: 
"As we view it, no hard and fast rule shouM 
prevail in such cases, and the statute should 
be given due effect, and, if a case is presente: 
the inherent equities of which require specific 
enforcement, it should be enforced without 
hesitation, and if, upon the other hand, such 
is not the case, specific enforcement shouM 
be denied." (Emphasis added). 
The Adams Court then went on to state: 
"(R) espondent' s claims are entirely devoid 
of equity." (Emphasis supplied) . 
The Supreme Court refused specific performance in 
Adams because the purchaser showed no equities at all in:.: 
favor! A close review of each and every subsequent case 
cited by Defendants will show a refusal of this Court to 
require specific performance only after the equities have 
been weighed, and found wanting on the part of the person 
seeking specific performance. 
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> 
In the instant case, the equities are overwhelmingly in 
favor of S'l'J\UFFERS and their family. They went into possession. 
They made substantial improvements. They occupied and 
resided upon the property. They buried their dead upon the 
property. They made all payments faithfully, as required by 
their contract. Defendants accepted STAUFFERS' money and 
never offered to return it. Land values rose precipitously. 
only when struck by a bad case of "Sellers' Remorse" did 
Defendants have any doubts about the lands STAUFFERS purchased. 
Then Defendants CALL sold their interest in the contract to 
SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION, which knowingly purchased this 
lawsuit for $60,000.00, giving Defendants CALL a second 
purchase price 500% of the original price. Upon appeal of 
the instant case, the Supreme Court followed its prior 
positions, found the equities in favor of STAUFFERS, and 
therefore reversed and remanded. 
In Jacobsen v. Cox, 115 Utah 102, 202 P.2d 714 (1949), 
this Court stated: 
"People who reside in faraway rural communities 
cannot be charged with unreasonable accuracy 
in describing unsurveyed land .............. . 
..... The original parties to the contract could 
not have described the land by metes and bounds 
without going to the expense of running a 
survey." 
The Jacobsen Court then stated, at 722: 
"Conceding that the contract has some infirmities, 
we deal with more than an oral contract. We have 
a written instrument which is attacked because of 
uncertainties and ambiguities. We are of the 
opinion that Plaintiff, by his acts and conduct, 
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q 
is estopped from taking advantage of the 
deficiencies. To hold otherwise would~ 
the Statute of Frauds to be used as a sherrn1it . le d to defeat what appears to be a Just and . 
cause against him." (Emphasis added). equlti: 
In this action, the results flowing from the lower 
court's decision "shock the conscience", and this Court. 
determined by its decision that it will not permit thos: 
results to stand and thus do inequity. It has, in effec:. 
estopped Defendants from taking advantage of any allege, 
deficiencies in the contract, and rightly so. Therefore, 
rehearing should be granted. 
POINT VIII 
EQUITY REQUIRES THAT NO REHEARING BE 
GRANTED. 
At 27 Am. Jur. 2d 516, "Equity", Section 1, we fini 
in part: 
part: 
"All great systems of jurisprudence have a 
mitigating principle or set of principles, ~ 
the application of which substantial justke 
may be attained in particular cases wherein tf.o 
prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law 
seem to be inadequate. From the point of vie1: 
of general jurisprudence, "equity" is the narre 
which is given to this feature or aspect of 
law in general. However, the term "equi~' 
has a variety of meanings. The word describes 
a system of jurisprudence, and it is empl~~ 
to designate the principles or standards of 
that sys tern. Such a use of the work is illust: 
by the maxim "equity regards as don~ tha~ w~ 
ought to be done. 11 In this connection, .1t ~ 
be observed that the court of chancery is . . 
sometimes referred to as a court of 'consc1~ 
(Emphasis supplied) . 
27 Am. Jur. 2d 518, "Equity", Section 2, states in 
"It has been s- id that one of the most saluter 
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principles of chancery jurisdiction is that, 
strictly speaking, it has no immutable rules. 
It lights its own pathway, blazes its own trail, 
2aves its own highway; it is, in short, an 
appeal to the conscience of the court." 
(Emphasis supplied) . 
This supreme Court, in the exercise of its equitable 
jurisdiction, determined that it would be unfair to let the 
decision of the lower court stand as rendered, and effectively 
refused to recognize the mechanistic formulae propounded 
~Defendants, favoring instead, a balancing of equities 
resulting in STAUFFERS' favor. 
Having determined the equities to be in STAUFFERS' 
favor, it would serve no good purpose now to grant a rehearing 
to review once more the contentions of Defendants. All 
parties have "had their day" before this Honorable Court, and 
the case should be remitted immediately to the trial court 
for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of 9 
January 1979. 
POINT IX 
EVEN IF THE FORMER LAW WERE AS STATED BY 
DEFENDANTS, NO REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED 
FOR THE REASON THAT THIS COURT, USING ITS 
COMMON LAW POWERS, MADE NEW LAW, BINDING 
IN THIS CASE AND IN THE FUTURE. 
Defendants are seeking a rehearing before this Court 
based upon claimed errors of law, among other things. A 
voluminous brief has been filed, setting out the alleged 
violations of law by the Court. No rehearing should be granted 
for the reason that the opinion of 9 January 1979, if Defendants' 
contentions are true, changed existing law to do substantial 
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justice in light of the circumstances of this case. 
The proposition that this Court can modify, create, 
change existing common law to meet the requirements Of ju: 
is so well accepted as not to require citation. In fact, 
it may very well have been the Court's specific intent 
to change the law, in view of the fact that no precedents. 
cited in its opinion, and in view of the fact that STAUFf[ 
in their Appellants' Brief, previously before the court, 
expressly invited the Court to change Utah law if it wen 
found by the Court to be in favor of Defendants' position, 
the interests of justice. 
If the changes were made in existing law, then no err 
on the part of the Court exists, and Defendants have no 
ground for rehearing. 
POINT X 
THE DECISION OF 9 January 1979, IS PRESUMED 
TO BE CORRECT, AND THEREFORE, NO REHEARING 
SHOULD BE ALLOWED, WHERE SUPPORTING BASES FOR 
THE DECISION EXIST. 
The opinion of 9 January 1979 cited no precedent, eit': 
statutory or common law. However, the acts of this Court 
are presumed to be correct, and therefore must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to STAUFFERS. Doctrines which 
provide support for the action of the court, among others, 
may be as follows: 
1. The inherent equity powers of the Court. 
2 1 · h 11 • • 11 or "techn1'cal" which • Estoppe , eit er in pa1s 
would estop Defendants from denying the existence of 
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-t to legal descriptions. agreemen as 
3. The common law powers of the Court to change existing 
law. 
4 . The power of the Court to review facts in matters of 
equity, to weigh the proof, and to overrule findings of lower 
courts, which is has done in many previous instances. 
s. The power of the Court to adopt persuasive, foreign 
common law as Utah law. 
6. The doctrine of "part performance" . 
since any of the foregoing could have supported the 
opinion of 9 January 1979, no error exists in the decision 
rendered, and no rehearing should be allowed. 
CONCLUSION 
No rehearing should be granted for the reasons that 
(1) Defendants have never filed a proper petition seeking 
rehearing and therefore are not entitled to such relief; 
(2) if Defendants' "Brief for Petition on Rehearing" is viewed 
as a petition for rehearing, it contains improper argument 
and reargurnent, and is not accompanied by a proper brief; 
(3) Justice Ellett has retired; (4) no "judicial notice" was 
taken; (5) if "judicial notice" was taken, a hearing on the 
same would have been a futile act, and Defendants could not 
have shown that a great increase in the value of the land did 
not occur following the making of the contract, the failure to 
hold a hearing therefore being only harmless error, if any; 
(5) no "dishevelment" of the record occurred, and the Court 
applied proper standards of review; (7) the doctrine of 
-23-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"part performance" was properly noted by the Court; (S) 
the Court properly exercised its equitable powers; (g) ii 
existing law had been in favor of Defendants, the Court 
properly made new law; (10) the opinion of 9 January 1979 
is supported amply by existing principles of law; and 
( 11) the equities are overwhelmingly in favor of STAUFFE'i 
Therefore, the case should be immediately remanded to the. 
court for execution of appropriate conveyances by Defendar.: 
to STAUFFERS, and for other necessary proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this /~3th day of March 1911 // /{f-d /'~ / / / ;{ I , /. ~~fie__-£ I). I ~ 
WILLARD R. BISHOP I 
Attorney for DAVID M. STAUFFER 
and CONNIE A. STAUFFER 
P.O. Box 279 
172 North Main Street 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Two copies of the foregoing were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to MICHAEL D. HUGHES, of ALLEN, THOMPSON, and HUC 
attorney for Defendants, Respondents and Cross-Appellants, 
to 148 E. Tabernacle, St. George, Utah 84770, first class, 
this _/~J_t_ti-_day of 
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